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We describe and report on results of employing a new method for analyzing lay
conceptions of intentional and unintentional action. Instead of asking people for their
conceptual intuitions with regard to construed scenarios, we asked our participants
to come up with their own scenarios and to explain why these are examples of
intentional or unintentional actions. By way of content analysis, we extracted contexts
and components that people associated with these action types. Our participants
associated unintentional actions predominantly with bad outcomes for all persons
involved and linked intentional actions more strongly to positive outcomes, especially
concerning the agent. People’s conceptions of intentional action seem to involve
more aspects than commonly assumed in philosophical models of intentional action
that solely stress the importance of intentions, desires, and beliefs. The additional
aspects include decisions and thoughts about the action. In addition, we found that the
criteria that participants generated for unintentional actions are not a mere inversion of
those used in explanations for intentional actions. Associations between involuntariness
and unintentional action seem to be stronger than associations between aspects of
voluntariness and intentional action.
Keywords: intentional action, experimental philosophy, Knobe-effect, concepts, lay conceptions, content analysis
INTRODUCTION
Due to their key importance for social understanding, ascriptions of intentionality are an
intensely studied research topic within the cognitive sciences, in particular in the ﬁelds of social
cognition (Malle et al., 2001) as well as in philosophy of mind and action (Bratman, 1987;
Audi, 1997; Mele, 2009). In recent years, there has been a clear tendency toward combining
empirical research and armchair reﬂection in order to investigate philosophical topics that were
previously mainly discussed on a purely theoretical level. This newly risen appreciation of empirical
methods in philosophy has spawned the so-called experimental philosophy movement (Weinberg
et al., 2001; Knobe, 2003a; Machery et al., 2004; Knobe and Nichols, 2008). While analytical
philosophers try to understand the meaning of a concept by thorough reﬂection on its essential
components, experimental philosophers employ methods from the social and cognitive sciences
to examine the use of a concept. They investigate what conceptual intuitions people have, i.e.,
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to which cases they apply a particular concept, and they attempt
to provide an account of the internal psychological processes
that underlie such applications (Knobe and Nichols, 2008). Most
experimental philosophy research takes the form of surveys in
which participants are confronted with various textual scenarios
(sometimes also called vignettes) and asked whether they would
apply the concept in question. It is frequently claimed that the
insights from this research are not only interesting in their own
right, but that they also provide valuable input for philosophical
debates on the meaning of particular concepts.
In this paper, we focus on the lay understanding of intentional
(and unintentional) action and describe how we have applied a
new method for analyzing it. We avoid speaking of the (folk)
concept of intentional action, unlike other researchers (e.g.,
Malle and Knobe, 1997). For at least two reasons it is very
controversial whether, and if so to what extent, experimental
philosophy studies can actually inform us about conceptual
content. First of all, there is no agreed deﬁnition of ‘concept,’
let alone ‘conceptual content’: depending on diﬀerent theoretical
commitments, concepts may be viewed as mental representations
of various kinds, as abilities, or as Fregean senses; and they may
be seen, amongst others, to have deﬁnitional, prototypical or
theoretical structure (Margolis and Laurence, 2014). Secondly,
the application of a concept may partly be driven by other
factors than the content of the concept, such as pragmatic norms
or currently present emotions (Machery, 2008). Although it
is disputable to what extent experimental philosophy research
informs about the meaning of concepts, it seems uncontroversial
that it can fulﬁll two important functions. Firstly, it can inform us
about what factors inﬂuence the application of certain notions,
such as the notion of intentionality, to particular cases. This
is achieved by the usual approach of presenting participants
with scenarios varying in one factor and to asking them
for their conceptual intuitions with regard to these scenarios.
Secondly, experimental philosophy research can inform us
about how non-philosophers understand certain notions such as
‘doing something intentionally.’ This can be achieved by asking
participants open questions about how they understand the
notion in question. Both of these approaches have advantages, but
also limitations. The scenario approach allows an examination of
the inﬂuence of speciﬁc factors on conceptual judgments in a very
controlled manner. However, by examining single factors, it is
diﬃcult to assess the relevant importance of the diﬀerent factors
that may play a role in the conceptual judgement. Moreover,
scenario studies may run the risk of missing important factors.
The advantage of open questions is that they can bring factors
into focus that have been neglected in previous scenario-based
research and that the responses to the questions may allow
the assessment of the comparative importance of the factors
that play a role. The downside of this approach is that people’s
responses to open questions may reﬂect (more than the scenario
approach) diﬀerent aspects, such as the actual meaning of a
notion, the pragmatic norms governing the use of the notion,
psychological factors that inﬂuence the application of the notion,
or lay theories about the usage of the notion, and these aspects
may be diﬃcult to disentangle. In this paper we follow the
second approach, because we think it is still an underexplored
method in experimental philosophy, but we acknowledge that
both approaches are important and work best in concert. Next,
we will brieﬂy review the previous experimental philosophy
research on intentional action in order to further motivate our
open question approach.
A study by Knobe (2003a) had a considerable inﬂuence on
the experimental philosophy movement as we know it today. He
used the now famous ‘chairman’ scenario in order to examine
under which conditions people would say that the side eﬀect of
an action was brought about intentionally. The scenario involves
the chairman of a company who needs to decide whether a
business project that would increase proﬁts but also harm the
environment, should it be implemented. He decides to carry out
the project, saying that he does not care at all about harming the
environment and that he wants to make as much proﬁt as he
can. Knobe found that most people thought that the chairman
harmed the environment intentionally. In an alternative version
that described exactly the same situation as the ﬁrst one, with
the exception that the word ‘harm’ was replaced by the word
‘help,’ most people did not believe that the chairman helped
the environment intentionally. This asymmetry in judgment is
now known as the Knobe eﬀect or the side-eﬀect eﬀect. Knobe
also found a corresponding asymmetry in people’s assignment
of praise and blame, namely that they are considerably more
willing to blame the agent for bad side eﬀects than to praise
the agent for good side eﬀects. Knobe’s study provoked a host
of explanations for the asymmetry, as well as descriptions
of mechanisms hypothesized to be involved in intentionality
ascriptions in general (for reviews, see Feltz, 2007 or Cova,
forthcoming). We shall brieﬂy review some of these.
Adams and Steadman (2004) argued that pragmatic features of
the term ‘intentionally’ can explain Knobe’s surprising ﬁndings.
When people say that someone did something intentionally, they
often use this term in order to assign blame. Consequently,
the intentionality ascriptions in Knobe’s study were inﬂuenced
by people’s desire to blame the chairman for harming the
environment. In accordance with this interpretation, Guglielmo
and Malle (2010) found that when people had the possibility
of choosing between diﬀerent descriptions, a vast majority ﬁnd
the phrase ‘the chairman knowingly harmed the environment’
most accurate, while only a few participants choose the phrase
‘the chairman intentionally harmed the environment.’ Uttich
and Lombrozo (2010) added a diﬀerent interpretation, according
to which adherence to and violation of norms inﬂuence
intentionality attributions. In contrast, Phelan and Sarkissian
(2008) showed that side eﬀects in scenarios that include neither
a morally signiﬁcant action nor the violation of any kind of
norm are still rated as brought about intentionally. According to
Machery (2008), people think in terms of costs to be paid, whereas
according to Sripada (2010), people take the central character
traits of an agent into account when determining whether she did
something intentionally.
These are just a few examples from the extensive experimental
philosophy literature on intentionality ascriptions. The point we
want to stress is that all these studies use a similar methodology
that we deem incapable of exhaustively explaining the use of the
notion of intentionality. They predominantly rely on scenarios
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that vary one component over diﬀerent conditions in order to
gain insights into the inﬂuence of an isolated aspect on the
ascription of intentionality. While oﬀering a clear and valid
experimental treatment with which the inﬂuence of certain,
isolated factors on intentionality ascriptions can be measured,
the insights that can be gained through this method are limited
and may not explain the whole picture. In the particular case
of the Knobe scenarios, there is an additional methodological
problem lowering the validity of the studies. Methodological
research has revealed that studies consisting of rare or implausible
scenarios are likely to distort responses, as participants disregard,
or fully exclude, the aspects causing the implausibility from their
decisions: in a paper by Auspurg et al. (2009) the inﬂuence of
implausible and uncommon scenarios on conceptual responses
was investigated, revealing that participants may take such
scenarios less seriously. They presented their participants with
a series of diﬀerent short descriptions of the educational level,
occupation, and demographic information of ﬁctional persons
and asked whether the income of that person was justiﬁed, in
order to assess which of these dimensions participants include in
their judgments. Among other variations, some of the scenarios
were rare or implausible, e.g., describing a person that works
in a ﬁeld that normally requires higher education or training,
but who did not obtain this kind of education. With the ﬁrst
presentation of an implausible case, responses changed, even
aﬀecting scenarios presented after the implausible ones. This
result was interpreted as an indication of the participants’
tendency to take a study less seriously as soon as an implausible
case was presented, posing a serious threat to the validity of
results obtained from such scenarios. Indeed the behavior of the
chairman in Knobe’s scenario is likely to be perceived as odd. In
our contemporary society, openly admitting not to care about
helping the environment and to wanting to make as much proﬁt
as possible would be seen as unusual. After all, the chairman
could just remain silent about his indiﬀerence about helping
the environment. Due to this unusual scenario in which the
agent presents himself in a more negative way than necessary,
we claim that the scenario only appears to be a plausible,
everyday situation, but on closer inspection turns out to be a
very rare case. Consequently, the validity of the judgments made
regarding the Knobe scenarios may be lowered, casting doubt on
their generalizability to other situations and most importantly,
whether this case is able to shed light on processes involved
in everyday intentionality ascriptions. Moreover, most of the
experimental philosophy studies have in common that they do
not take into consideration what people themselves believe to be
relevant for an action to be intentional.
Knobe’s above-mentioned study from 2003 has strongly
inﬂuenced the methodology that experimental philosophers have
employed since then. Ironically, a few years before that study,
Malle and Knobe (1997) had published an article in which
they reported a survey (study 2 in that paper) that employs
a method which we deem more capable of revealing people’s
general conception of intentional action. In that study, they
asked people explicitly what they have in mind when they say
that somebody did something intentionally. They then analyzed
the participants’ written deﬁnitions in order to determine to
which aspects they refer. Malle and Knobe’s straightforward
approach has the clear advantage that it takes into account
ordinary people’s ideas about intentionality. Setting aside the
dispute about whether intentions can be reduced to sets of desires
and beliefs, there is a wide agreement among philosophers of
action that intentions, beliefs, and desires are closely linked
to intentional action (e.g., Bratman, 1987; Audi, 1997; Malle,
2004; Mele, 2009). It is usually assumed that an agent who acts
intentionally desires a particular outcome, believes that the action
will produce this outcome, and consequently intends to perform
the action. Moreover, it has been proposed that one needs to
believe that one is able to perform the action and to bring about
the desired outcome in order to act intentionally (Shaver, 1985).
Consistent with this broad consensus, Malle and Knobe identiﬁed
desire, belief, and intention as dominant components in their
participants’ responses. However, in contrast to common three-
way models of intentional action, they identiﬁed awareness as a
fourth essential component in the given deﬁnitions. Moreover,
although not mentioned by the participants in their explanations,
an additionally conducted scenario study (study 3 in that paper)
led them to conclude that the agent’s skill in performing the
action adds a ﬁfth essential component to people’s concept of
intentionality. However, in a later article, Knobe (2003b) rejected
the view that skill is always essential. In a series of studies
he showed that evaluative considerations have a signiﬁcant
inﬂuence on whether people consider skill to be crucial for acting
intentionally. For instance, people tend to judge immoral actions
to be intentional, even when the agent has demonstrably no skill
to perform the action.
Although we agree with Malle and Knobe’s general approach
of employing open questions, we remain skeptical about their
speciﬁc method of data analysis. The categories to which they
assigned participants’ responses were very broad. They grouped
a variety of vastly diﬀerent statements under each of their
categories. For instance, the intention category included ‘the
intention to perform the act’, ‘intending,’ ‘meaning,’ ‘deciding,’
‘choosing,’ and ‘planning to perform the act.’ It might well be
true that all these terms can be analyzed as being related to
intention. For example, we may deﬁne a decision as an act of
intention formation and planning can be seen as intention guided
action preparation. However, even if we assume that these are
uncontroversial conceptual analyses of ‘decision’ and ‘planning’
(which is disputable), Malle and Knobe run the risk of eliminating
potentially important data from their analysis when they lump
these terms together. After all, it cannot be disputed that
decisions, plans, and intentions, although conceptually related,
are diﬀerent phenomena. It might be the case that participants
deem decisions or plans to be important for intentional action
irrespective of their (possible) relation to intention. Using very
few, theory-driven categories to analyze participant generated
responses is a common approach, because it simpliﬁes the coding
procedure (see alsoMonroe andMalle, 2010; Stillman et al., 2011;
Böhm and Pﬁster, 2015), but in our view, these classiﬁcations are
too strongly driven by the researchers’ preconceptions rather than
by participants’ actual responses. Our aim is to develop a method
of analyzing explanations in a manner that stays closer to the
actual responses.
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We may distinguish two ways of analyzing participant
generated responses: conﬁrmative and exploratory analysis.
A conﬁrmative analysis uses free responses in order to test
speciﬁc theoretical assumptions about how people apply or
understand certain notions. Malle and Knobe’s (1997) study,
as well as the other studies mentioned in the last paragraph,
can be seen as belonging to this category. In these studies
broad categories are applied to the data to test hypotheses
that are, although not always explicitly, derived from previous
theorizing. Another approach is an exploratory analysis that
seeks to impartially derive categories from the actual responses
given. Such an exploratory analysis resonates with the Grounded
Theory approach, which puts emphasis on deriving theories from
qualitative data, rather than just using the qualitative data to
verify existing theories (Glaser and Strauss, 2009). We argue
that a conﬁrmative analysis should ideally be preceded by an
exploratory analysis, so that components that are not already
included in existing theories can be found and evaluated. In the
present study we will pursue such an exploratory strategy, since
we want to allow for the possibility that factors that have not been
included in philosophical models of intentional action turn out
to be important in lay conceptions of intentional action.
We see our study as contributing to the development of
new methods that are able to reveal the components of abstract
knowledge structures more accurately (see also Bunge and
Skulmowski, 2014). We think that people may ﬁnd it diﬃcult
to answer a general deﬁnitional question, such as the one
posed by Malle and Knobe (1997). They asked ‘When you
say that somebody performed an action intentionally, what
does this mean? Please explain.’ The notion of intentional
action is rather abstract and the majority of people will
not have a satisfactory deﬁnition readily at hand if asked
for one. Based on empirical evidence indicating the central
role of concrete experiences in the formation of knowledge
about abstract entities (Barsalou, 1999, 2005), we assume that
providing examples of concrete intentional actions will make it
easier to give a deﬁnition of intentional action. The concrete
examples will facilitate the recall of important information
that would otherwise be rarely available. Instead of asking
people what they mean when they say that somebody did
something intentionally, we asked the participants of our survey
to come up with several concrete examples of intentional and
unintentional actions or behavior, including a short description
of the speciﬁc situation they have in mind. The underlying
assumption of this approach is that people’s conception of
intentionality determines which kind of examples they come
up with. These examples eventually allowed us to determine,
by means of content analysis, some contextual factors that
people associate with intentional and unintentional actions. We
also provided the participants with the opportunity to indicate
how sure they were about their example being an instance of
an intentional or unintentional action. Furthermore, we asked
them to explain why they believed that each particular action
described was intentional or unintentional. From the analysis
of these explanations, we attempted to determine what criteria
people think are constituents of intentional and unintentional
actions.
A prominent criticism of experimental philosophy is that
surveys can only inform us about surface intuitions, whereas
philosophical dialog and reﬂection is needed to reveal robust
intuitions (Kauppinen, 2007). In order to deal with this criticism,
we designed our survey in a manner that prevents participants
from being rather passive “evaluators” of a given scenario,
instead letting them actively describe their associations and
justify their explanations, coming closer to a philosophical dialog
than the current standard method. By asking our participants
for several examples of intentional and unintentional actions,
by requesting assessments of their degree of certainty, and
by requiring them to provide explanations, we prompt the
participants to actively reﬂect upon the notion of intentional and
unintentional action, and to reﬁne their responses during this
process. As each participant comes up with several scenarios, the
risk that only very atypical examples are mentioned is minimized.
Typical examples have a higher probability of being recalled
and produced (Rosch, 1978). This ensures that the numerical
distribution of criteria that are extracted from the explanations
adequately mirrors the relative importance of each of these
criteria within the lay conception of intentional action.
We decided to focus our attention on three hypotheses. While
the ﬁrst hypothesis targets the scenarios of (un-)intentional
action, the second and third hypotheses refer to the participant’s
explanations for why a given action is (un)intentional. Firstly,
we assumed that doing something intentionally is associated
with positive outcomes, while unintentionality is linked with
negative outcomes (Hypothesis 1). This expectation might seem
surprising in the light of the Knobe eﬀect. In fact, it is the opposite
of what we would expect if the Knobe eﬀect was generalizable
to intentionality ascriptions per se. In Knobe’s (2003a) study an
agent who brought about a negative consequence (harming the
environment) was predominantly judged to act intentionally,
while an agent who produced a positive outcome (helping the
environment) was largely judged to act unintentionally. We
suspect that this eﬀect is generated by the speciﬁcs of the scenario
used. Commonsense tells us that intentional actions are not
necessarily harmful. Admittedly, people sometimes intentionally
harm others or their environment, but for most people this is
not the standard mode of action. Quite to the contrary, most
of our everyday intentional actions are aimed at producing
positive outcomes for ourselves or those people around us.
We expected that our participants’ responses would reﬂect
this assumption. By contrast, unintentional action may well be
associated with negative outcomes, as they are not under people’s
control. In fact, we often excuse negative outcomes by saying
that we did not produce them intentionally. As a result, we
expected that our participants’ unintentional action scenarios
would predominantly feature negative outcomes. In line with
our exploratory approach, we did not formulate any speciﬁc
predictions as to what criteria our participants would mention
in their explanation for why a certain action is intentional or
unintentional. However, we had a general expectation that those
criteria that our participants wouldmention would bemore ﬁnely
diﬀerentiated than those components (belief, desire, intention)
ordinarily highlighted in philosophical models of intentional
action (Hypothesis 2). As far as we are aware, no one else has
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so far investigated in detail the nature of people’s conception
of unintentional action. The tacit assumption seems to be that
the lay conception of unintentional action is just an inverted
version of the lay conception of intentional action. By contrast,
we expected that people would refer to diﬀerent, and not just
inverted, criteria in their explanations for why a given behavior
is intentional, as compared to those criteria mentioned in the
explanations for why a behavior is judged to be unintentional
(Hypothesis 3).
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Participants
The study was conducted as an online survey. The link was
distributed over social networks and online forums. A coupon
lottery was used as an incentive to participate. Only native English
speakers over the age of 18 were invited to participate, in order to
keep the results comparable with results of existing research. Over
a period of 3 months, 131 participants (84 female) completed the
survey. Informed consent was obtained from all participants. The
study was approved by the ethics committee of the University of
Osnabrück.
Experimental Procedure and Materials
After giving their informed consent and conﬁrming that they are
native English speakers, participants indicated their gender. The
ﬁrst part of the survey consisted of three pages with the following
instructions and questions on each page:
(1) Please come up with one scenario of a speciﬁc person
(John) doing something intentionally. Please also describe the
setting. (2) How sure are you that your scenario is an example
of doing something intentionally? Please rate on a scale from −3
(completely unsure) to 3 (completely sure). (3) Why do you think
what he does in your scenario is intentional? Please explain. These
items were followed by three further pages, each containing the
following instructions and questions:
(1) Please come up with one scenario of a speciﬁc person
(Paul) doing something unintentionally. Please also describe the
setting. (2) How sure are you that your scenario is an example of
doing something unintentionally? Please rate on a scale from −3
(completely unsure) to 3 (completely sure). (3) Why do you think
what he does in your scenario is unintentional? Please explain.
As each participant accordingly provided us with six scenarios,
we ended up with a total number of 786 scenarios, each with
a corresponding explanation. Half of these (393) were scenarios
featuring intentional actions or behavior, while the other half
consisted of scenarios with descriptions of unintentional actions
or behavior. It is to note that we use the terms ‘action’ and
‘behavior’ interchangeably, because the focus of our research is
on how people distinguish between intentional and unintentional
action/behavior, rather than on how they distinguish between
action and mere behavior.
Scenario Categories
In the case of the scenarios, we agreed that two dimensions were
of particular interest. Firstly, although not directly bearing on any
of our hypotheses, we judged it worthwhile to record whether or
not other people beside the agent were involved in the described
scenarios. Scenarios in which only the agent (John or Paul)
was involved were labeled as ‘non-social,’ whereas scenarios in
which others were also involved were labeled as ‘social.’ We were
interested in whether there is a diﬀerence between the relative
degree of association of each of these two cases with intentional
and unintentional actions. The concrete deﬁnitions of these and
the other categories mentioned below were listed in the coding
instructions that were handed to the coders.
Secondly, the actions described in the scenarios diﬀered
according to whether they would likely have good or bad
consequences for the agent or for the other people involved.
Again, the question arose whether there is a diﬀerence between
the relative degree of association of each of these two cases
with intentional and unintentional actions. This dimension
allowed us to test hypothesis 1. In case no consequence was
explicitly mentioned in a scenario, coders were instructed to
judge what kind of eﬀect the described action usually has, based
on their own experience and knowledge. As it is sometimes
diﬃcult to determine whether an action has positive or negative
consequences, and as a particular consequence might be neutral
in valence, we also oﬀered our coders the opportunity to choose
the option ‘indeterminable consequences.’ The coders had to
follow the decision tree depicted in Figure 1. Either they labeled a
scenario as ‘non-social’ or ‘social.’ If they labeled it as ‘non-social,’
they only had to determine the goodness of the consequence of
the action for the agent. If they instead decided that the scenario
belongs to the social category, they had to decide for both the
agent and for the other person(s) whether the consequence is
good, bad, or indeterminable.
Explanation Categories
In order to address hypotheses 2 and 3, we searched through
the explanations to ﬁnd relevant criteria for intentional and
unintentional actions. Our analysis methodology was based on
the basic principles of Grounded Theory (Glaser and Strauss,
2009). That is, we used qualitative responses as a means to
identify concept components that are as close to the actual
utterance as possible. Since we did not want to subsume possibly
unrelated criteria under a single category based on theoretical
assumptions, we ﬁrst generated a list of key words from the
explanations. Key words were merged only when they were
evidently synonymous (both semantically and pragmatically).
Using dictionaries and logical analyses, synonymous phrases
were reduced and global categories were formed. During this
procedure, we made sure that semantic content was grouped
correctly without losing any signiﬁcant information. English
native speakers were involved in this process.We found criteria of
various kinds, includingmental states of the agent (e.g., intention,
desire), capacities of the agent (e.g., free will, skill), but also
features of the action (e.g., norm-violating, being an accident,
being a side eﬀect), and the manner in which the action was
performed (e.g., actively, automatically, as a routine).
In total, we included 18 category labels for the intentional
action explanations: ‘intention,’ ‘decision,’ ‘desire,’ ‘thinking about
the action,’ ‘free will,’ ‘control over the action,’ ‘doing something
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FIGURE 1 | Coding scheme for scenarios.
in order to achieve something,’ ‘actively doing something,’
‘eﬀort,’ ‘knowing how to perform an action,’ ‘knowing about
the consequences of one’s action,’ ‘routine,’ ‘awareness,’ ‘normally
intentional,’ ‘norm-violating behavior,’ ‘mental capacity,’ ‘skill,’
and the residual category ‘other’.
For the unintentional action explanations, we included 23
criteria, some of which were negations of the criteria for
intentional action and some of which were unique to the
unintentional action explanations: ‘lack of intention,’ ‘lack of
decision,’ ‘lack of desire,’ ‘not thinking about the action,’ ‘lack
of control because of external factors,’ ‘lack of control because
of internal factors,’ ‘negative eﬀects for the agent,’ ‘not actively
doing something,’ ‘eﬀortlessness,’ ‘not knowing how to perform
an action,’ ‘not knowing about the consequences of one’s action,’
‘automatic behavior/ response,’ ‘lack of awareness,’ ‘normally
unintentional,’ ‘inattention,’ ‘accident,’ ‘action is based on false
information/ assumptions,’ ‘indiﬀerence,’ ‘unconsciousness,’ ‘not
consistent with the agent’s personality traits,’ ‘feeling regret,’ ‘side
eﬀect,’ and the residual category ‘other.’
There is no one-to-one mapping of the intentional and
unintentional criteria, i.e., we did not add an opposing version
of each item to the other list and vice versa. We refrained from
creating such a mapping because this would have increased the
number of criteria tremendously, making the coders’ work much
more diﬃcult. Also, creating independent lists for intentional
and unintentional action criteria allowed us to stay closer to the
actual wording used by our participants in these two conditions.
Coders were allowed to assign more than one category to each
explanation.
Coding Procedure
Coding was initially completed by a total of 16 undergraduate
Psychology and Cognitive Science students of the University
of Osnabrück. Proof of either having studied English for
8 years or being a competent user of English as assessed
using language tests is an admission requirement for studying
Psychology or Cognitive Science at this university. Besides this
formal qualiﬁcation the coders were interviewed to assess their
language competency. They all received course credit for their
participation. The material was distributed randomly among
them. In an introductory session that lasted for 2 h, they were
instructed to strictly follow our coding instructions. They were
required to pay close attention to the exact wording of each
category description and to select the appropriate categories for
the scenarios and explanations. During the following week, they
worked on the rest of the data at home, which amounted to an
additional workload of about 2–3 h. Consistently, two coders
worked on the same material, which enabled us to calculate the
inter-observer agreement for each category. The coded data was
checked by the authors, to make sure that the coders had followed
the instructions accurately. As a result, it became apparent
that eight of the 16 coders had not suﬃciently followed our
directions (more than 10% of the responses were deemed clearly
inconsistent with the coding instructions). The same material
was then randomly distributed once more among eight new
coders.
In general, independent coding of each item, as a basis for later
reliability determination, was achieved by the following process:
we took the total number of items (scenarios and explanations,
respectively) and divided them into subsets, each to be coded
by one student. Then we made a second copy of each of these
subsets, which was coded by another student. The material of
the 786 scenarios was divided into three subsets, each of which
was distributed to two coders. As coding of the explanation was
viewed to be more time-demanding, the 786 explanations were
divided into ﬁve subsets, each of which was again coded by two
coders. As we came to know during the subsequent analysis
that one of these subsets was still faulty (more than 10% of the
items were deemed clearly inconsistent with the instructions), we
excluded this subset from further analysis. The rest of the coding
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was deemed to be in accordance with the coding instructions
(Supplementary Material). As a result, a total of 644 twice-coded
explanations were ﬁnally analyzed.
RESULTS
For each category, we calculated how often it occurred in the
total material. We summed the occurrences of the category in
the individual subsets that had been given to the coders and, as
we had duplicated the material previously, divided the sum by
two. Knowing the total frequencies of the categories and the total
number of scenarios and explanations, we were able to calculate
the ratios presented below.
Scenarios
In general, our participants were very conﬁdent that their
scenarios were good examples of intentional or unintentional
actions. However, the mean certainty value in the intentional
condition (M = 2.72, SD = 0.51) was signiﬁcantly higher than in
the unintentional condition (M= 2.26, SD= 1.25), t(130)= 4.25,
p < 0.001, d = 0.37.
The ratio of social to non-social context ascription was largely
the same for intentional and unintentional action scenarios, χ2(1,
N = 786) = 3.15, p = 0.076, v = 0.06. For the intentional
scenarios, the amount of non-social context categorization was
considerably higher (62%) than the amount of social context
ascription (38%), χ2(1, N = 393) = 22.48, p < 0.001, v = 0.24.
The same is true for the unintentional scenarios, where 56%
were coded non-social and 44% social, χ2(1, N = 393) = 5.15,
p = 0.023, v = 0.11. We calculated Cohen’s Kappa (κ) as
measure of the inter-observer agreement. A Cohen’s Kappa
value of 0 denotes agreement at chance level, while a value
of 1 indicates perfect agreement. Hereafter, we will use the
common interpretation of Cohen’s Kappa introduced by Landis
and Koch (1977) and denote the strength of agreement as slight
between 0 and 0.2, as fair between 0.21 and 0.4, as moderate
between 0.41 and 0.6, as substantial between 0.61 and 0.8, and
as almost perfect between 0.81 and 1. We note that ﬁndings
that exhibit Kappa values below the middle range of moderate
agreement (lower than κ = 0.41–0.6), should be interpreted with
caution as they come close to the chance level of the spectrum.
Fortunately, the inter-observer agreement along the social/non-
social dimension was substantial in the unintentional condition
(κ = 0.75) and almost perfect in the intentional condition
(κ = 0.84).
The analysis of the consequence dimension conﬁrmed our
ﬁrst hypothesis. Consequences for the agent were evaluated as
positive for 76% of the intentional scenarios, while they were
evaluated as indeterminable and negative much less frequently
(16 and 7%, respectively), χ2(2, N = 393) = 331.71, p < 0.001,
v = 0.92 (see Figure 2). An opposite pattern was observed for
the unintentional scenarios. Here, 73% of the scenarios were
categorized as having negative consequences for the agent, 15% as
having indeterminable consequences, and 12% as having positive
consequences, χ2(2, N = 393) = 282.55, p < 0.001, v = 0.85.
The consequences for agent category in the intentional scenarios
revealed only a slight strength of agreement (κ = 0.21) and should
thus be interpreted with caution. The consequences for the agent
in the unintentional scenarios achieved a moderate strength of
agreement (κ = 0.52).
For the social scenarios, the coders chose to characterize
55% of the intentional scenarios as having positive consequences
for others, 35% as having negative consequences for others,
and 11% as having consequences for others whose valence
was indeterminable, χ2(2, N = 141.5) = 41.51, p < 0.001,
v= 0.54. Because of the comparatively high frequency of negative
consequences for others, this distribution is clearly diﬀerent from
the aforementioned distribution of the consequences for the
agent in intentional action scenarios, χ2(2, N = 534.5) = 62.07,
p < 0.001, v = 0.34. Again, a quite opposite eﬀect was
demonstrated for the unintentional scenarios. Of these, 81%were
coded as having negative consequences for others, while 10%
were categorized as having positive consequences, and 9% as
having indeterminable consequences, χ2(2, N = 176) = 181.92,
p< 0.001, v= 1.02. There was a substantial strength of agreement
for the consequences for others category in the intentional
explanations (κ = 0.71), but only a fair strength of agreement in
the unintentional explanations (κ = 0.31).
Explanations
Coders were allowed to choose more than one category
per explanation. In regards to intentional action, they most
often assigned ‘intention,’ which was present in 21% of the
explanations, closely followed by ‘decision’ (19%), ‘thinking
about the action’ (18%), ‘desire’ (15%), ‘doing something in order
to achieve something’ (14%), and ‘normally intentional’ (10%; see
Figure 3). This lends initial support to our hypothesis 2. We will
further elaborate on this issue in the discussion section.
As these were the most prominent categories, a few
more words about how they were deﬁned in the coding
instructions are in order. The category ‘intention’ comprised
‘intending something’ and ‘having an intention,’ as well as
phrases like ‘doing something on purpose’ and ‘meaning to do
something.’ We included references to choice and to options
within the category ‘decision.’ ‘Thinking about the action’
was deﬁned as a conscious thought process that precedes
the action. Coders were required to choose this category if
the explanation referred to relevant planning, deliberation,
consideration, premeditation, or preparation in advance of the
action. Under the label ‘desire’ phrases like ‘wanting/ wishing
to do something,’ ‘feeling like doing something’ or ‘need to
do something’ were grouped. As object of desire, both the
action itself and the consequences of the action were possible.
Examples for phrases belonging to the category ‘doing something
in order to achieve something’ included ‘doing something in
order to,’ ‘having a reason to do something,’ ‘having an aim/
objective in mind,’ and ‘aiming to achieve a result/ goal.’
If a participant claimed that a particular kind of action is
always done intentionally or that the action is impossible to be
performed unintentionally the category ‘normally intentional’
was chosen. For example, if a participant explained that tying
shoe laces cannot be done unintentionally, this category was
applied.
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FIGURE 2 | Valence of the consequences for the agent and for others in scenarios of intentional and unintentional actions. Bars indicate the percentage
of scenarios in which the respective consequence type was present. Note that all scenarios were relevant for coding of the consequences for the agent, but only
social scenarios were relevant for the coding of the consequences for others.
Of these ﬁve most mentioned categories, only ‘doing
something in order to achieve something’ failed to reach a
moderate strength of agreement (κ = 0.39). In general, the
strength of agreement observed between coders was as follows:
almost perfect (κ = 0.81–0.99) for one category, substantial
(κ = 0.61–0.80) for four categories, moderate (κ = 0.41–0.60)
for ﬁve categories, and fair (κ = 0.21–0.40) for another ﬁve
categories. Only three categories (‘Knowing how to perform
the action,’ ‘Skill’ and ‘Mental capacity’) exhibited agreement at
chance level or below (κ <= 0). However, this aspect is only
marginally relevant, because these three categories have been
applied to very few explanations.
Comparing the criteria mentioned for intentional action with
those for unintentional action conﬁrms our third hypothesis,
according to which the unintentionality concept diﬀers in
its components from the intentionality concept. As already
indicated, the category ‘intention’ was found only marginally
more often in the explanations for why an action is intentional
than the second most frequent category, ‘decision.’ For the
explanations of unintentional actions, a quite diﬀerent picture
emerged (see Figure 4). Here ‘lack of intention’ (27%) was more
than twice as often mentioned as the second most prominent
category – in this case ‘lack of desire’ (13%). Following next were
‘inattention’ (10%), ‘lack of control because of internal factors’
(9%), ‘accident’ (8%), and ‘normally unintentional’ (8%). ‘Lack
of intention,’ ‘lack of desire,’ and ‘normally unintentional’ were
deﬁned as the absence of their above-mentioned counterparts.
The label ‘inattention’ was used for behavior that was said to
have occurred because the agent acted carelessly or did not attend
suﬃciently to what she was doing. Following our guideline,
so as to stay close to the participants’ responses, we deﬁned
two ‘lack of control’ categories. Two quite diﬀerent sources
of lack of control are possible. The source can be external to
the agent, e.g., if someone forces her to do something, and
the source can be internal, e.g., if the agent has a compulsive
disorder or is overwhelmed by her emotions. Apparently, ‘lack
of control because of internal factors’ appeared more often in
the explanations than external lack of control. Adding up the
percentages of the lack of control categories would result in the
second most frequent category (15%), which would, however,
still be much less frequent than ‘lack of intention’ (27%). Also,
simply adding up the percentages of both categories leads to an
overestimated result. As coders were allowed to assign several
categories to one explanation, they could also assign both kinds
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FIGURE 3 | Categories in descending order of their occurrence in participants’ explanations for why a described action is intentional. Bars indicate the
percentage of explanations in which the respective category was present. Summed percentages exceed 100% as some explanations contained more than one
category. Cohen’s Kappa reliability values are noted in brackets behind the category names. Some names are abbreviated versions of the labels used in the coding
instructions.
of lack of control to one explanation. Thus, by adding up the
frequencies presented here, some explanations might be counted
twice. Lastly, the deﬁnition of ‘accident’ was straightforward.
All behavior that was described as happening accidentally or
as the result of a mistake was labeled with this category. All
these most mentioned categories exhibited at least a moderate
strength of agreement between coders (κ >= 0.41). In total, one
category showed a perfect agreement between coders (κ = 1),
ﬁve categories exhibited substantial (κ = 0.61–0.80) agreement,
eleven categories moderate (κ = 0.41–0.60) agreement, and six
categories fair (κ = 0.21–0.40) agreement between coders.
DISCUSSION
Scenarios
The high certainty values conﬁrm that it was easy for our
participants to come up with examples of intentional and
unintentional actions. Hence, we are reassured that their
responses genuinely reﬂect their understanding of intentionality.
However, on average, participants felt more certain about
the intentional scenarios than about the unintentional ones.
Reviewing the explanations, a possible reason for this becomes
apparent. It seems that some participants were aware that
seemingly unintentional behavior can still prove to be intentional
if certain conditions are met. For instance, one participant came
up with a scenario in which the agent is busy at work and so
forgets to meet a friend at the cinema. On the face of it, forgetting
an appointment is unintentional, but the participant was not so
sure, as can be seen by the explanation: ‘He was preoccupied with
work and lost track of time. It is a possible (sic) that he didn’t
really want to see the movie and therefore allowed himself to lose
track of time.’ In this case, the participant’s certainty is lowered,
as forgetting the appointment might be intentional under the
speciﬁc condition that the agent deliberately lost track of time.
Another source of confusion might have been that what some
participants described was not, in fact, a case of unintentional
action, but, rather, of what some philosophers have described as
non-intentional action (Chan, 1995). Similarly, some participants
might have been unsure about whether their example involves
any action at all. Arguably, forgetting an appointment is not an
action.
The social/non-social context dimension did not reveal a
considerable diﬀerence between intentional and unintentional
action scenarios. The higher number of non-social contexts
than social contexts for both scenario types reﬂects the fact
that situations involving only the agent came more readily into
the mind of our participants than situations featuring more
than one person. Also, it might indicate that our participants
tended to keep their stories simple by focusing on the main
protagonist. For both the intentional and the unintentional cases,
we found a high inter-coder agreement along this dimension.
This shows that the coders had, as expected, no diﬃculties
deciding whether a given scenario involves only the agent or
others as well.
The consequence dimension conﬁrmed hypothesis 1,
according to which intentional behavior is associated with
positive outcomes, whereas unintentional behavior is linked
to negative consequences. The consequences for the agent in
intentional action scenarios were deemed positive far more often
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FIGURE 4 | Categories in descending order of their occurrence in participants’ explanations for why a described behavior is unintentional. Bars
indicate the percentage of explanations in which the respective category was present. Summed percentages exceed 100% as some explanations contained more
than one category. Cohen’s Kappa reliability values are noted in brackets behind the category names. Some names are abbreviated versions of the labels used in the
coding instructions.
than negative. This ﬁnding is not surprising, as it reﬂects the fact
that people do not normally perform an action intentionally that
creates disadvantages for themselves. The desire to create positive
outcomes for oneself (or to prevent harm from oneself) can
arguably be seen as one of the central psychological attitudes of
an agent. According to Sripada’s (2010) deep self model, actions
that concord with the agent’s core psychological attitudes are
likely to be judged intentional. Other accounts of intentionality
ascription are less apt to explain the data. For example, the
models by Machery (2008) and Uttich and Lombrozo (2010)
refer to costs and norm violations, respectively, but the non-
social scenarios involving intentional action largely lack these
factors. However, one has to bear in mind that the mentioned
models were designed in order to account for the asymmetries
in side-eﬀect scenarios like the one used by Knobe (2003a)
and are thus not meant to provide an account of intentionality
ascriptions per se. A word of caution is in order, because the
coders agreed only slightly on the goodness of consequences
for the agent. This is probably due to the diﬃculty in deciding
whether a consequence is indeed good or just neutral. There were
many scenarios for which one coder classiﬁed the consequences
as good for the agent, whereas the second coder classiﬁed them
as indeterminable. An example of such a scenario is the following
one: ‘John was sitting on his couch at home watching TV. He
picks up the remote and changes the channel.’ On the basis of the
given information, it is indeed hard to say whether it is good for
John to change the channel. We instructed the coders to use their
‘experience and knowledge about the world to decide about the
goodness of consequences.’ Of course, this leaves considerable
room for interpretation. However, although the coders did
not always agree on what category to assign, each individual
coder classiﬁed far more intentional scenarios as having good
consequences for the agent than as having bad consequences,
indicating that the described eﬀect is robust.
The consequences of intentional actions for others were more
often positive than negative as well. Apparently, examples of
someone intentionally doing something good for someone else
were more easily accessible in the minds of our participants
than examples of someone intentionally harming someone
else. However, the frequency of negative consequences for
others in intentional action scenarios was considerably higher
than the frequency of negative consequences for the agent in
intentional action scenarios. This is still in line with Sripada’s
(2010) concordance principle, because bringing about bad
consequences for others may indeed concord with an agent’s
central psychological attitudes, if we assume that the agent
has a mean character. Take for example this scenario: ‘John
intentionally rips out an important part of a book so that
his classmate who needs the same material cannot get the
information his (sic) needs.’ However, the literature on the Knobe
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eﬀect provides us with an array of additional, and presumably
mutually compatible, explanations for the comparatively higher
proportion of scenarios with negative consequences for others
than for the agent in the intentional action condition. For
example, we can speculate that the common practice of assigning
blame by means of ascribing intentionality might have guided
participants to come up with scenarios in which the agent
harms others (Adams and Steadman, 2004). Moreover, bringing
about negative consequences for others usually involves a norm
violation (e.g., violation of the norm not to sabotage with
others learning materials) and we might assume with Uttich and
Lombrozo (2010) that the common link between norm violations
and intentionality ascriptions led many participants to come up
with cases of norm violations when asked for an intentional
action. Finally, one might claim in line with Machery (2008) that
actions that incur costs (e.g., negative consequences for other
people) in order to reap beneﬁts are commonly associated with
intentionality. Although the negative consequences for others
were more frequent than the negative consequences for the agent
in the intentional action condition, it needs emphasizing that
the positive consequences for others outbalanced the negative
consequences for others in the intentional action condition. This
shows that the link between negative eﬀects and intentionality of
an action that has been found in side-eﬀect scenarios such as the
ones used by Knobe (2003a) does not generalize to intentionality
ascriptions per se. In general, people are quite willing to say that
an action that did produce a positive outcome for others has been
performed intentionally. This conﬁrms our assumption that the
results from scenario studies must be interpreted with caution.
They can provide insights about which factors can inﬂuence the
application of a concept, but they certainly do not necessarily
inform us about the relative importance of those factors in
day-to-day applications of the concept. The coders reached a
substantial degree of agreement with respect to the consequences
for others in the intentional action scenarios. Apparently, the
consequences for others were easier to determine than the
consequences for the agent. Presumably, participants made it very
plain whether the agent’s action was intended to aﬀect others
positively or negatively, but did not state as clearly whether or
not the agent beneﬁted from it.
Turning to the consequences of the unintentional actions, we
observed a reversed pattern. Here, the negative consequences
for both the agent and for others clearly outnumbered their
positive counterparts. Most participants came up with stories
of accidents and characterized the agent as acting inattentively
or as lacking control over the behavior in question. To name
just one example: ‘Paul knocks a glass oﬀ the table. He’s sitting
at the table eating breakfast.’ It is commonsense that people
do not normally bring about such eﬀects intentionally. The
unintentional action scenarios with eﬀects on others show a
similar pattern: ‘Paul was crossing the road and was looking
down at the newspaper he was reading instead of where he
was going so he bumped into someone by accident and they
fell over.’ Again, these ﬁndings are in line with Sripada’s (2010)
deep self model. One can speculate that accidents are usually at
odds with the agent’s core psychological attitude that one should
prevent harm to oneself and others, and are thus judged to be
unintentional. However, other explanations from the literature
on intentional action remain possible. Take for example the
pragmatic aspects emphasized by Adams and Steadman (2004).
The practice of excusing one’s behavior by saying that it was
unintentional might have prompted participants to come up
with scenarios featuring bad outcomes. Once again, the observed
pattern speaks against the generalizability of the Knobe eﬀect.
In Knobe’s (2003a) study, positive consequences (helping the
environment) were linked to the judgment that bringing forth
these consequences was unintentional. By contrast, we found that
our participants link unintentional actions to negative outcomes.
We assume that the Knobe eﬀect is speciﬁc to side-eﬀect scenarios
of a speciﬁc kind, but of course few of our day-to-day actions
share these features. In any case, the clear prevalence of negative
eﬀects in the unintentional scenarios that our participants came
up with is striking, considering that there are actually a lot of
potentially unintentional every day behaviors without negative
eﬀects that people could have mentioned: inattentively listening
to music, walking around while being occupied with one’s
thoughts, rocking the chair on which one is sitting, etc. The
coders’ agreement with respect to the consequences for the for
others was comparatively low in the unintentional condition
(κ = 0.31). This is once again due to the problem that some coders
were more inclined than others to classify the consequences as
indeterminable. However, each coder classiﬁed the consequences
as negative in the vast majority of the cases, which let us assume
that this general eﬀect is robust.
Explanations
Components of Intentional Action
Our analysis provides a close-up view of the criteria people
associate with the notion of intentional action. Rather than
applying a few criteria inferred from theory to the participants’
responses, we followed a bottom-up approach by staying close
to their actual statements. An important question that we will
address in this section is how our ﬁndings relate to the widely
held view that intentions, desires, and beliefs are the sole core
components of the intentional action concept (e.g., Bratman,
1987; Audi, 1997; Mele, 2009). Also, we will elaborate on
other criteria, especially awareness and skill, which have been
mentioned in the experimental philosophy literature (Malle and
Knobe, 1997).
At ﬁrst glance, only two of the components included in classic
three-way models of intentional action are present in our list of
criteria: intention is at the top position in our ranking and desire
is at the fourth position. Instead, supporting our hypothesis 2,
a range of other criteria are present. We did not even include a
‘belief ’ criterion in our coding instructions, as this word and its
derivations almost never occurred in our participants’ responses.
In fact, it occurred only four times in the 322 intentional action
scenarios analyzed, while two of these occurrences were clearly
about the participants’ beliefs and not about any belief state of
the agent. However, other criteria in our list might reﬂect what
other authors would subsume under the label ‘belief.’ Similarly,
there might be criteria in our list that other authors would add to
the ‘intention’ and ‘desire’ categories. Hence, it is worthwhile to
examine how others deﬁne these categories. Here, we will focus
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on the deﬁnitions given by Malle and Knobe (1997, study 2), as
our investigation was inspired by their study.
We will begin with intention, as this was the most often
mentioned component both in our and in Malle and Knobe’s
survey. As already mentioned, in their study, a response had to
mention ‘the intention to perform the act, intending, meaning,
deciding, choosing, or planning to perform the act’ in order to
qualify for the intention category. Interestingly, ‘decision’ was the
second most mentioned category in our study. Had we collapsed
our ‘decision’ category with the ‘intention’ category, as proposed
by Malle and Knobe, this would have led to a huge frequency
diﬀerence between this merged category and what would then
become the second most mentioned category, ‘thinking about the
action.’ Note, however, that simply adding up the percentages
of the intention and decision categories mentioned in the
results would lead to an inaccurate frequency estimate of the
merged category, as both categories might have been assigned to
single explanations. In addition, references to planning, which
we grouped under ‘thinking about the action,’ would probably
qualify as ‘intention’ on Malle and Knobe’s account. However,
in our view, deciding and planning are conceptually diﬀerent
enough, both from each other and from intending, that it is not
warranted to conﬂate them into one single ‘intention’ category.
Although one might argue, in defense of the above account,
that planning an action or deciding upon an action usually
leads to an implementation intention, we note that this does
not imply that the former are equivalent to the latter within
peoples’ conception of intentionality. People might, for example,
focus solely on the planning or decision aspects of an action
while not being aware of the intention aspect of this action
when determining whether something was done intentionally.
Merging all these aspects into one category renders it impossible
to examine whether this is the case. Admittedly, one might also
argue that responses that fell under the category ‘doing something
in order to achieve something’ are closely linked to intention.
This category was chosen if the agent was said to act for a
reason or to have a goal in mind and this might indeed imply
having an intention. Admittedly, the low coding agreement for
the category ‘doing something in order to achieve something’
likely reﬂects that the coders were confused about whether to
assign this category or the category ‘intention.’ As Malle and
Knobe kindly provided us with the responses from their study, we
are able to report that the word ‘intention’ was mentioned only
three times among their subjects’ 159 responses. Nevertheless,
their coding resulted in a frequency of 51% for the ‘intention’
component. The low frequency of the actual word ‘intention’
in their data might be due to the participants’ reluctance to
give circular deﬁnitions. They might have simply considered it
obvious and not worth mentioning that an intention is necessary
for acting intentionally. Our study design counteracted this
confounding factor. As our participants were required to give
several explanations, each more elaborate than those elicited by
Malle and Knobe, they had enough room to mention a wide
range of criteria, including the most obvious. Consequently,
we detected ‘intention’ to be the most important component,
although we stayed closer to the explicit statements of our
participants.
The desire category was assigned by Malle and Knobe if a
response mentioned ‘the desire for an outcome or the outcome
itself as a goal, purpose or aim.’ This corresponds fairly well
with our deﬁnition of desire. However, we have to assume
that they also assigned the ‘desire’ label to responses that we
grouped under ‘doing something to achieve something.’ Even
though we acknowledge that someone who does something in
order to achieve something is likely to have a desire for what
is to be achieved, we think that our principle of staying close
to what participants actually mention warrants our distinction.
However, we acknowledge that the close connection between
‘doing something to achieve something’ and ‘desire’ might be
another factor that contributed to the problematically low coder
agreement for the category ‘doing something in order to achieve
something.’ Nevertheless, we agree with Malle and Knobe that
desire seems to be central to people’s conception of acting
intentionally.
As already mentioned, the term ‘belief ’ and its synonyms
rarely occurred within our participants’ responses. Philosophical
models of intentional action frequently emphasize beliefs about
how desired outcomes can be brought about, or beliefs about
one’s ability to perform a certain action and to produce a
certain outcome. This corresponds in our study very closely
with the categories ‘knowing about the consequences of one’s
action’ and ‘knowing how to perform an action.’ The category
‘knowing about the consequences of one’s action’ has only
been mentioned in about 3% of the scenarios and the category
‘knowing how to perform an action’ in about 1% of the scenarios.
However, we acknowledge that the conclusion that beliefs play
no role in people’s conception of intentional action would
be premature. Arguably, although our participants have not
explicitly mentioned belief states, this component is likely hidden
in the third most often mentioned category, ‘thinking about the
action.’ Thinking about an action obviously draws on beliefs,
which may include beliefs about the consequences of the action
or about one’s ability to perform the action. Accordingly, one
can reasonably argue that the belief component is implied in
references to this category. Similarly, references to the category
‘doing something in order to achieve something’ might tacitly
imply the belief that one can achieve a desired outcome, adding
another reason why the coders did not suﬃciently often agree
on when to assign the ‘doing something in order to achieve
something’ category. As a result, we must remain somewhat
agnostic about the importance of the belief component in the
lay conception of intentional action. The evidence is mixed:
People rarely make explicit references to belief states in their
explanations for why a given action is intentional, but from a
conceptual analytic point of view many of the references they
make imply belief states. It might just be that non-philosophers
are less used to the talk about beliefs than philosophers and
thus rather refer to various kinds of thought processes implying
beliefs.
Let us now turn to the question as to how our ﬁndings relate
to Malle and Knobe’s claim that awareness is a further important
component of people’s intentionality concept. Similarly to our
characterization of the awareness category, Malle and Knobe
assigned this category if a deﬁnition mentioned ‘awareness of
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the act while the person is performing it.’ In contrast to their
study, awareness played only a minor role in the responses
of our participants. Also, our other categories do not seem to
reﬂect what Malle and Knobe mean by ‘awareness.’ Admittedly,
one might argue that thinking about an action usually involves
awareness. However, our ‘thinking about the action’ category was
clearly deﬁned as encompassing thoughts preceding the action,
whereas Malle and Knobe point to awareness of performing the
action. Hence, we can conclude that conscious thought before
the action but not necessarily awareness during action is part of
people’s conception of intentional action.
The agent’s skill in performing an action played almost no role
in our participants’ responses. Malle and Knobe speculated that
the lack of the skill component in their participants’ deﬁnitions
of intentional action may be due to the fact that they may have
‘only considered interpersonal behaviors, for which skill can be
assumed’ (p. 109). We can rule out this explanation, because
in our study participants did consider behaviors that were not
interpersonal (what we call non-social scenarios) and still did not
mention skill as an important criterion.
In summary, we propose that intention, desire, decisions,
and thoughts about actions are indeed central to people’s
understanding of intentional action. Belief might well be another
central component of the lay conception of intentional action.
Although people do rarely refer to belief states when explaining
why a given action is an intentional action, belief states
are conceptually implied in some very frequently mentioned
categories. One might want to object that decisions and thoughts
about actions again imply (or are closely linked to) intentions,
beliefs, and desires. This may well be true, but we ﬁnd it
important to stress that decisions and thoughts about actions
are not reducible to sets of intentions, beliefs, and desires.
Thoughts about actions, for example, may not only involve the
tokening of beliefs, desires, and intentions, but also reasoning
about these states and drawing inferences. Our participants
may genuinely think that intentional action requires thought
processes, irrespective of the fact that thought processes may
draw on beliefs, desires, and intentions of the agent. Further
research is needed to investigate this possibility. For example, one
could design scenarios that vary the amount of thoughts an agent
spends on planning an action, while keeping the desire, beliefs,
and intentions of the agent constant, and examine whether
peoples’ willingness to say that the agent acts intentionally
is aﬀected by this. We acknowledge that the category ‘doing
something in order to achieve something’ is problematic as it
is closely related to desire, belief, and intention and therefore
exhibited only low coder agreement. In fact, ‘doing something
in order to achieve something’ may just be another way of
saying that something was done intentionally. Although less
important than intention, desire, belief, decision, and thoughts
about actions, the category ‘normally intentional’ was also quite
often mentioned. Admittedly, this category does not inform
us about people’s conceptions of intentionality. But it tells us
something about a shortcut that people frequently use when
making intentionality judgments. If a behavior is immediately
perceived as a typical case of intentional action, people do not
require any additional evidence, such as information about the
agent’s mental states, to make their judgment. For instance, it is
commonsense that binding shoe laces is an intentional activity.
Interestingly, free will has also been mentioned remarkably often.
However, this result must be regarded with caution as the coder
agreement for ‘free will’ was comparatively low.
Components of Unintentional Action
To our knowledge, with the exception of the current study,
nobody has yet examined in detail what aspects people associate
with unintentional behavior. The tacit assumption appears to
have been that people’s conception of unintentional action is just
an inverted version of their conception of intentional action.
In line with our third hypothesis, our study indicates that this
assumption is not justiﬁed. A comparison of our lists of criteria
for intentional and unintentional actions (see Figures 3 and 4)
reveals considerable diﬀerences. However, let us ﬁrst brieﬂy focus
on the commonalities.
In each list, the relevant intention category (‘intention’ or
‘lack of intention,’ respectively) occupies the top position. It is
also notable that ‘lack of desire’ turned out to be the second
most frequently mentioned criterion for unintentional behavior,
because its counterpart ‘desire’ is very prominent in the list
of categories for intentional action as well. Apparently, desire
plays a central role both in peoples’ conception of intentional
action and unintentional action. Another category that is present
in both lists is ‘normally (un-)intentional.’ Just as in the case
of paradigmatically intentional actions, there are behaviors that
are so strongly associated with unintentionality that people do
not need to search for further criteria in order to make their
judgments. Obviously, someone who falls down the stairs does
not normally do this intentionally.
Besides these aspects, there are clear asymmetries between
both lists. The large frequency diﬀerence between the category
‘lack of intention’ and the second most mentioned category
within the list of components of unintentional action, ‘lack of
desire,’ is remarkable, considering that the category ‘intention’
was not as clearly distinguished from the other categories in
the case of intentional action. This may indicate that people
assume having an intention to be necessary but not suﬃcient
for acting intentionally. The absence of an intention is seen as
a sign of an action’s being unintentional, but the presence of an
intention is not enough for an action to qualify as intentional,
because additional criteria must be met. As another asymmetry,
‘decision’ was the second most frequently mentioned category
for intentional action but ‘lack of decision’ was almost never
mentioned in the case of unintentional behavior. Apparently,
for our participants a decision foregoing an action is a clear
indicator for the intentionality of the action, but a lack of decision
does not seem to be central to their conception of unintentional
action. Also, the third most frequently mentioned category in
the case of intentional action, ‘thinking about the action,’ was
much less frequently mentioned in its negated form in the
case of unintentional behavior. Instead, criteria like ‘inattention,’
‘lack of control because of internal factors,’ and ‘accident’ are
important when it comes to unintentional action. All these
categories indicate that people strongly associate involuntariness
with unintentional behavior. By contrast, when asked why an
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action is intentional, people presumably see no need to mention
that the action was no accident, that the agent had control over
what he was doing, and that he paid attention to his action.
Limitations and Objections
A shortcoming of our study is certainly that for some categories
the coders did not even achieve moderate agreement (κ < 0.41).
With respect to our scenario categories, this was the case for
consequences of the agent in intentional action scenarios and
the consequences for others in unintentional action scenarios.
Consequently, the respective results have to be interpreted with
caution. In this study, we instructed the coders to judge what
kind of eﬀect the described action usually has based on their
own experience and knowledge. This was in line with our general
approach of not imposing those preconceptions that we hold as
researchers on the coding process. However, future studies could
explore how the coding reliability could be increased by giving
coders more precise guidance on what is to be coded as a good
or bad consequence for an agent and other people aﬀected by
the action. With respect to the explanation categories, a higher
inter-rater reliability might have been achieved by formulating
fewer categories. However, there is a trade-oﬀ between the
informativeness of the data gained and inter-rater reliability. We
decided to conduct an exploratory analysis, which we deem to
be high in informative value, because it allows us to compile
an exhaustive list of relevant criteria for intentional action that
may inform the hypothesis generation for future experimental
philosophy research. For example, our ﬁnding that decisions
and thoughts about actions were frequently mentioned in the
intentional action explanations raises the question as to whether
intentionality ascriptions are indeed inﬂuenced by these factors,
independently of their relation to intentions, desires, and beliefs.
One may also object that our approach left room for many
subjective decisions as to how to formulate the individual
categories. However, we think that compiling a list of all keywords
mentioned in all responses and merging only those that are
logically, semantically, and pragmatically the same has proven
a useful method that outperforms approaches presented in
previous studies using the free-response paradigm (Malle and
Knobe, 1997). Admittedly, researchers using our method will
face trade-oﬀ decisions between accurately capturing all relevant
components and keeping the list of categories short enough to be
useful for later interpretation.
A further limitation of our exploratory approach is that it
leaves some room for interpretation as to what our participant’s
explanations actually reﬂect. First of all, it is not clear whether
the participants deemed those criteria that they mentioned
suﬃcient, necessary, or both necessary and suﬃcient for acting
(un-)intentionally. For example, we may interpret an explanation
that contains several components as an exhaustive deﬁnition,
including several necessary and jointly suﬃcient conditions, or
as a loose set of several conditions that may be taken to be
individually suﬃcient but not necessary for acting intentionally.
We cannot resolve this interpretation problem at this point. All
we can say is that when we aggregate the participants’ responses
some criteria turn out to bemore important than others. We leave
it to future experimental philosophy research to decide whether
people think of these individual criteria as necessary, suﬃcient or
both necessary and suﬃcient conditions for acting intentionally.
Secondly, it must be noted that our participants’ responses are
fallible guides to what factors actually inﬂuence intentionality
ascriptions. Their responses reﬂect what they think are reasons
for saying that a given action is intentional, but of course the
actual psychological processes that guide their intentionality
ascriptions might be blind to (some of) these reasons or sensitive
to other factors. For example, it is possible that people are
not aware of all those factors that drive their intentionality
ascriptions, or that they name for pragmatic reasons only some
of these factors.
Relatedly, one may object that participants might simply have
considered some explanations for why an action is intentional
or unintentional overly obvious and thus not worth mentioning,
as suggested by Gricean maxims of conversation (Grice,
1975). Consequently, our results would not reﬂect the most
important components of people’s conceptions of intentional
and unintentional action, but rather those components that
our participants consider most informative. This possible
shortcoming of studies relying on free-response explanations has
been discussed by Böhm and Pﬁster (2015) based on a variety
of similar studies (Hilton, 1990, 2007; Slugoski et al., 1993;
Hilton and Slugoski, 2001). However, if it were the case that
our participants did not mention important criteria due to their
low informative value, they should have also been reluctant to
name intention as a criterion for intentional action. After all, it
is most obvious that intention is linked to intentional action. As
we have seen, ‘intention’ actually turned out to be the most often
mentioned category, speaking against this view.
Lastly, one might object that our ﬁndings have no implications
for philosophical analyses of intentional action. After all,
philosophers have, in contrast to our participants, considerable
expertise in analyzing concepts. Our participants might simply
be mistaken about what conditions must be met for acting
intentionally, while philosophers might be better trained for this.
Like the expert in physics, who should not consult folk physics
in order to learn something about magnetism, one might argue
that the philosopher should not rely on lay persons’ responses in
order to learn something about intentional action. However, on a
closer look, there is an important diﬀerence between these cases.
Whereas ‘magnetism’ is a theoretical term rarely used in ordinary
conversation, ‘intentionality’ is a term that is common to peoples’
linguistic practices. Hence, it would be odd if philosophers called
something ‘intentional action’ that is largely unrelated to people’s
use of the term (Knobe and Nichols, 2008). At the very least,
philosophers who put forward a model of intentional action that
is not in accordance with laypersons’ conceptions should be able
to explain why their model diﬀers from the general use of the
term.
CONCLUSION
In light of our results, we are convinced that our exploratory
method of probing peoples’ conception of intentionality is a valid
and important addition to the ordinary vignette approach used in
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experimental philosophy and social cognition research. Rather
than asking our participants for their conceptual intuitions
regarding artiﬁcial scenarios, our participants could construe
their own scenarios and give their own explanations for why
they think that a given action is intentional or unintentional.
Consequently, our investigation was largely driven by the
actual responses of participants, rather than by previous
theoretical assumptions. The analysis of the given scenarios
allowed us to detect a clear pattern in the valence of the
consequences linked to intentional and unintentional actions.
People associate unintentional actions predominantly with bad
outcomes for all persons involved and link intentional actions
more strongly to positive outcomes, especially concerning
the agent. Moreover, we were able to extract from our
participants’ explanations a range of components that they
link to intentional action. These are most notably intentions,
desires, decisions, and thoughts about actions. We can also
speculate that beliefs play an important role in peoples’
understanding of intentional action. Our participants did not
explicitly refer to belief states in their explanations, but some
of the categories that they referred to conceptually imply belief
states. Although empirical evidence of how non-philosophers
apply the concept of intentional action cannot falsify deviating
philosophical analyses of that concept, we think that a convincing
conceptual analysis should take into consideration people’s
actual usage of the concept in question. Lastly, we showed
that people’s conception of unintentional action is not just
an inversion of their conception of intentional action. In
addition to lack of intention and lack of desire, unintentional
behavior is strongly linked to inattention, lack of control, and
accidents.
SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIAL
The Supplementary Material for this article can be found
online at: http://journal.frontiersin.org/article/10.3389/fpsyg.
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